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Abstract 
This study posits that security analysts heed corporate social performance information and factor 
it into their recommendations to general investors. In particular, as corporate social performance 
is often uncertain and ambiguous to general investors, analysts may serve as the informational 
pathway connecting corporate social performance to firm stock returns. Thus, we argue that 
analyst recommendations mediate the relationship between corporate social performance and firm 
stock returns. On the basis of not only a qualitative study with literature searches and interviews 
of stock analysts but also a quantitative study with two longitudinal samples of large firms, we 
find support for these arguments. Our findings uncover an information-based underlying 
mechanism for the link between corporate social performance and financial performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A large number of previous studies have analyzed the direct link between corporate social 
performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). Despite these efforts, there are 
still on-going debates and controversial arguments about whether and how CSP influences CFP 
(e.g., Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003; 
Ramchander, Schwebach and Staking, 2012). Hence, there is a high need to penetrate the black 
box linking CSP and CFP and gain a better understanding of its underlying mechanisms. 
This study uncovers an information-based mechanism for the CSP-CFP relationship, by 
examining the mediating role of analyst recommendations in the relationship. In particular, it 
recognizes that firm CSP is multi-dimensional in nature and hence generally complex, which 
renders it arduous for general investors to have an in-depth understanding of CSP and precisely 
gauge its quality. Despite the availability of professional ratings on firm CSP dimensions (e.g., 
KLD, Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4), such information is too intricate to be directly understood and 
priced by general investors who are not certified industry experts and are often constrained by 
time and resources (Fombrun, Gardberg and Barnett, 2000; Surroca, Tribo and Waddock, 2010). 
Thus, not all CSP information can be automatically incorporated into firm stock performance 
efficiently (Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009).  
Security analysts, on the other hand, are certified industry experts skilled at obtaining 
private information that is not readily accessible to general investors, and so are better able to 
assess the value relevance of firm CSP information (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004). Our 
qualitative aspect of the study based on a search of existing literature and interviews of analysts 
suggests that analysts do pay a great deal of attention to CSP and factor it into stock 
recommendations. Accordingly, we propose a mediation role of security analysts in the CSP-CFP 
link: analyst recommendations act as an informational pathway through which CSP affects CFP. 
To formally test this argument, we further collected quantitative data and conducted analyses with 
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two longitudinal samples of large firms. Results of the quantitative analyses provide systematic 
support for the mediating role of analyst recommendations. 
Our first contribution to the literature is to demonstrate the role of analysts as a key 
information intermediary for stock market participants to value CSP. Specifically, we explicate 
the mechanism by which CSP influences firm financial performance, i.e., by identifying how 
security analysts act as information channels to clarify the value and relevance of CSP for general 
investors. Our results suggest that the financial performance effect of CSP can be better 
materialized when security analysts heed firm CSP information. Indeed, without examining the 
information bridge of analysts, the CSP-CFP link can be distant or illusive. Yet, with it, the link 
can be made clearer. As strategy theories demonstrate growing concerns for the elusive ‘business 
case’ of CSP and fund managers increasingly ‘invest with a conscience,’ our work places the 
spotlight on analysts and supports that information-based mechanisms account for the eventual 
shareholder value impact of CSP.  
Second, the analyst mechanism helps reinterpret prior findings and advance future research 
in this regard. For example, we provide a potential explanation of mixed findings of the CSP-CFP 
relationship in prior studies, by pointing to an important information-based contingency (where 
analysts can reduce the information asymmetry between firm CSP and general investors) for the 
relationship. Our results imply that when security analysts are active in the firms’ operational 
environment, the benefits that firms gain from CSP are more likely to be realized. We thus 
provide insights for how such research should be conducted by calling for future work to examine 
the specific contingencies underlying the information-based mechanism that links CSP to CFP.  
Lastly, the findings of this study help, to a certain extent, reconcile the literature on 
shareholder vis-à-vis stakeholder primacy debate. While the classical finance theory suggests that 
the goal of a corporation is shareholder value maximization (Jensen, 2001), the stakeholder theory 
holds that corporations should be responsible for all relevant stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). One 
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implication of this study is that as shareholders increasingly value corporate social performance, 
firms that take better care of their various stakeholders are more likely to attract shareholders to 
buy their stocks and enhance share returns ultimately. This echoes Stout’s (2012) view of 
“universal investors,” who recognize that valuable assets are not merely equity shares but also 
stakes in the community, the economy, and even the entire planet. Such broadly defined assets 
nowadays make it even more challenging for general investors to precisely gauge and price CSP 
(i.e., higher information asymmetry, Godfrey et al., 2009). In this sense, stock analysts are more 
and more likely to be catalysts that help materialize the link between shareholder investment 
returns and firm social activities targeting broader stakeholder groups. The more shareholders as 
universal investors (Stout 2012), the more analysts play a pivotal information-bridging role, 
through which shareholder and stakeholder views can be better aligned.  
THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH  
This section reports the results of our literature search and interviews that suggest analysts do 
heed firm CSP information and incorporate it in their recommendations to investors.  
Based on a joint survey of 388 fund managers and financial analysts initiated by CSR 
Europe, Deloitte, and Euronext (2003), 79% of fund managers and analysts indicated that social 
management has a positive impact on firm value in the long term, and around 50% of them take 
into account corporate information on social and environmental performance. Most importantly, 
51% of fund managers and 37% of financial analysts respectively would grant a stock price 
premium to socially responsible companies (CSR Europe et al., 2003). Professional analysts such 
as investment banks and brokerage houses even have divisions that specifically analyze firm CSP 
data (e.g., Goldman Sachs, HSBC, and Credit Suisse).  
Such analyst emphasis on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is further evidenced by 
the increasing demand of investors for CSR (Dhaliwal et al., 2012). According to the survey, 78% 
of investors discuss CSR issues with sell-side analysts (ECCE, 2007) and 56% of corporations 
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indicate that investors requested information on non-financial goals including CSR metrics (BNY 
Mellon, 2012). Bruce M. Kahn, Director and Senior Investment Analyst at Deutsche Bank, 
reports that "a growing number of ...clients are asking for ESG [i.e., environmental, social, and 
corporate governance] criteria integrated" (BSR, 2009: 13).  
Indeed, an increasing number of initiatives integrates ESG factors into mainstream 
investment analysis (Jemel-Fornetty, Louche, and Bourghelle, 2011) because "mainstream 
analysts...were starting to pay more attention to the potential for ESG-related research to add 
investment value" (A4S, GRI and Radley Yelda, 2012; CAMRADATA, 2013; Eurosif and 
ACCA, 2013; PRI, 2013: 24). For example, Eccles, Serafeim and Krzus (2011: 117) counted 44 
million total queries in the Bloomberg database between November 2010 and April 2011 and 
conclude that while at Deutsche Bank (2012: 28) "mainstream corporate analysis considers key 
financial data...main criteria, but analysts actively screen companies with poor ESG ratings or 
involvement in controversial ESG issues."  
Our own in-depth interviews with analysts and those conducted by Fieseler (2011) provide 
further qualitative evidence of analysts’ increasing attention to CSP. First, our own interviews (n 
= 28, each interview lasted about 30 minutes on average) confirm that majority of these analysts 
monitor CSP closely in the firms they cover, albeit with diverse approaches. For example, 
analysts of a major European bank report that they rely on two data sources for CSP information. 
The first is RepRisk, which provides a quantitative indicator about the likelihood of reputation 
risks caused by activities related to poor working conditions, corruption, human rights violations, 
and environmental destruction. The second is RobecoSAM, which specializes in sustainability 
investing. Some other analysts we interviewed emphasize CSR as a key gate keeper for stock 
recommendations. As one analyst states,  
"Even if financial analysis suggests a stock is undervalued, we do not issue a buy 
recommendation if the firm is likely to receive negative CSR reports…" (Sell-side analyst, 
interview, 29 August 2013) 
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Based on interviews with 42 mainstream financial analysts, Fieseler (2011) holds that 
analysts use CSP to gauge management’s long-term orientation and the financial well-being of 
firms, confirming that social responsibility strategies might have been converging with economic 
strategies to become part of the mainstream investment analysis (Fieseler, 2011: 138): 
“The reality is that we are interested in financial performance at the end of the day. But 
there is enough evidence to suggest that corporate governance, good sustainability and 
environmentally friendly behavior add value over the longer term – although it is hard to 
immediately measure that in financial terms.” (Buy-side analyst, interview, 21 April 2006). 
 
“I am interested in a company’s strategic position regarding its core business – especially 
in the long term, not only right now. (. . .) I believe that [social and environmental issues] are 
part of this long-term perspective. They can be interesting criteria to back up an investment 
decision.” (Sell-side analyst, interview, 8 May 2006). 
 
Our research also reveals that analysts discuss various types of CSR-related information, 
including issues regarding the environment, products, employee relations, corporate governance, 
community, and others, in their analyst reports. Table 1 provides examples of such information 
from analyst research reports issued between 2003 and 2011. Taking environment-related 
information as an example, content analyses of European and American sell-side analysts’ reports 
show that about 36% of those reports contain CSR information (Cerin, 2010; Nilsson, 
Cunningham, and Hassel, 2008). Analysts often regard green technology or new environmental-
friendly practices such as waste water treatment as meaningful corporate contributions to long-
term growth. The analysts of Sal. Oppenheim initiated coverage of Petrotec with a “buy”-rating 
because “a rising environmental awareness is one of the initial drivers for renewable energies.”  
Another example can be found in KRChoksey’s report on Praj Industries. In 2011, Praj 
Industries Limited (PIL), a firm engaged in the business of process and project engineering for 
brewery plants, decided to enter into water & waste water treatment, customized engineering, and 
bio-consumables. KRChoksey reported that “regulatory changes in US and higher crude prices 
will make ethanol production more viable now. Fresh order resumption and the steady recovery of 
the global economy will bring business back to Praj.” Considering such government shift towards 
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cleaner fuels, KRChoksey estimated that this new plan would win “a business opportunity of 
USD 7-8 bn for PIL” and the company “has started receiving [investor] enquiries for the same.” 
Analysts are also concerned about CSP-related accreditations such as ISO-14001 and OHSAS-
18001, which are standards for occupational health and safety management (see Firstcall’s report 
on Kansai Nerolac Paints in Table 1). Analysts use this information to highlight the superiority of 
corporate management and business operations, especially when few companies in this industry 
receive such accreditations, and thus provide “buy” recommendations to general investors.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
The aforementioned qualitative study leads to the insights that (1) a significant proportion of 
analysts are aware of CSR information and consider it important and (2) analysts incorporate CSP 
information in their reports to general investors for buy or sell recommendations. This suggests 
that CSP is positively associated with analyst stock recommendations. Moreover, prior finance 
literature has established that investors depend on (and pay substantial fees to) analysts’ 
recommendations to make buy-hold-sell decisions (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004). Womack 
(1996: 164) reports that stock prices adjust “either up 5 percent for changes to buy-
recommendations or 11 percent for changes to sell-recommendations.” This suggests that analyst 
recommendations have significant influences on firm stock returns.  
Further, given the possible presence of information asymmetry between CSP information 
and investors, a mediating role of analyst recommendations in the relationship between CSP and 
future firm stock returns is expected to exist. As Howe, Unlu and Yan (2009: 799) note, ‘analyst 
recommendations contain additional information content and forecast future returns.’ Thus, we 
can also expect that general investors reply on analysts to certify and convey the informational 
relevance of CSP (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). Indeed, Godfrey et al. (2009: 428) hold that only 
CSP activities that ‘capture the attention of outside evaluators (e.g., investment rating analysts) 
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are substantial enough to be seen as a credible commitment,’ implying the importance of analyst 
recommendations in providing investors professional guidance about the quality of CSP.  
Accordingly, we raised the following research question: Do analyst stock recommendations 
mediate the relationship between firm CSP and future stock returns? 
THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES 
Data and Measures 
To address the research question, we collected two longitudinal datasets on firm CSP: one with 
the Thomson Reuters data on firm environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) and the 
other with the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini and Co. (KLD) data. Specifically, the ESG data source 
has covered more than 4,300 firms listed in the S&P 500, NASDAQ 100, STOXX 600, Russell 
1000, FTSE 100, ASZ 300, MSCI World, MSCI Europe, and MSCI Merging Market 
(thomsonreuters.com). This dataset consists of four pillars (ASSET4): environmental, social, 
economic, and governance performance. For each firm, over 250 objective indicators are used to 
calculate the four pillar scores. Following previous studies (e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Eccles et 
al., 2011; Peiris and Evans, 2010), we use the environmental and social pillars to measure CSP for 
each firm. Environmental performance refers to the firm’s resources reduction, emission 
reduction, and product innovation benefiting the environment. Social performance refers to the 
firm’s product responsibility, community, human rights, diversity, training and development, 
health and safety, and employment quality. To account for industry competition, we use the ratio 
of a firm’s ESG to the average ESG of all competing firms in the industry as defined by SIC 
codes as the final measure of ESG in our analysis. 
In addition, we used the KLD data, a data source widely employed in the strategy and 
management literature (e.g., Coombs and Gilley, 2005; Surroca et al., 2010), to construct an 
alternative measure of CSP. Specifically, KLD compiles annual ratings of over 3,000 publicly 
traded U.S. firms, which consist of the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 firms and 150 firms from 
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the Domini Social Index. KLD rates companies on a wide range of activities that reflect how well 
companies perform in social responsibility and build relationships with various stakeholders. 
KLD captures over 94 measurement items along seven social dimensions: product safety, 
diversity, employee relations, community relations, corporate governance, environmental 
stewardship, and human rights (wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/kld/). For each measure, KLD offers 
‘strength’ and ‘concern’ (e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997; Waldman, Siegel, and Javidan, 2006) 
for each firm year. Because prior studies suggest a theoretical distinction between 
primary/technical stakeholder dimensions (employee relations, product safety, and governance) 
and secondary/institutional stakeholder dimensions (community relations, environmental 
stewardship, diversity and human rights) of CSP (Godfrey et al., 2009: 434; Mattingly and 
Berman, 2006), we also test the relevance of this distinction by using the primary versus 
secondary CSP types. To account for industry competition, we use the ratio of a firm’s CSP to the 
average CSP of all competing firms in the industry as the final measure of CSP in our analysis.  
Both ESG and KLD data sources have dramatically increased their coverage of firms over 
time.1 However, because not all firms covered in KLD are publically-traded, to match with firm 
stock prices data, we have to drop these firms. In addition, because we want to test the 
relationships between CSP and analyst stock recommendations from I/B/E/S, we have to merge 
data sources across firms covered by I/B/E/S, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP, as well as ESG or KLD. 
After merging these various data sources, we are left with a dataset for 349 firms over eleven 
years (2000 to 2010) for a total of 3,839 firm-year data points with KLD-based CSP. Also, we 
have 857 firms over nine years (2002-2010) for a total of 7,713 firm-year observations with ESG-
based CSP because ESG data starts from 2002. However, because we employed a differences-in-
differences model, we lost one year of data in analyses.  
                                                            
1  For example, KLD has expanded the coverage of firms over time, from about 650 firms in 2000 to the largest 1,000 
firms in 2001 and the largest 3,000 firms in 2010 by market capitalization (Dhaliwal et al., 2011: 64). 
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To match the CSP data, we obtained financial analysts’ stock recommendations from I/B/E/S. 
Essentially, I/B/E/S provides comprehensive data on analyst recommendations, firm earnings 
forecasts, and other financial items for publicly-traded companies (Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004; 
Womack, 1996). It presents a unique opportunity for testing the relevance of CSP in guiding 
investment decisions in the stock market. I/B/E/S covers more than 45,000 companies from 70 
markets worldwide. Because multiple financial analysts follow each publicly traded company, and 
each analyst provides multiple investment recommendations for each firm, we originally collected 
a total of 126,598 observations of analyst stock recommendations. I/B/E/S measures analyst 
recommendations as the median consensus of buy-hold-sell recommendations provided by 
analysts to investors (e.g., Howe et al., 2009; Luo et al. 2010; Womack, 1996). Originally, this 
measure is reported in a reversed Likert scale with 1 = strong buy, 2 = buy, 3 = hold, 4 = 
underperform, and 5 = sell. For ease of exposition, we transformed this reverse coding.   
In addition, we obtained stock price data from CRSP to derive firm stock returns. 
Specifically, firm stock return is measured as the abnormal return beyond what is expected from 
the broad financial markets. To measure expected return from the broad financial markets, we use 
the Fama-French-Carhart model (Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 1993; Luo et al. 2014) at the 
firm level as follows:  
(1)                  
where Rit are stock returns for firm i in time t, Rm are average market returns, Rf  is the risk-free 
rate, SMB are size effects, HML are value effects, MOM are Carhart’s momentum effects, β0i is 
the intercept, and εit is the model residual. We then calculate abnormal returns (ASRit) as the 
difference between the observed returns and the expected returns, as follows: 
(2)    . 
Data for the Fama–French–Carhart factors and momentum (Rm, Rf , MKT, SMB, HML, and 
MOM) are from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
    ,)( 43210 ittititiftmtiiftit MOMHMLSMBRRRR εβββββ ++++−+=−
[ ]tititiftmtiiftitit MOMˆHMLˆSMBˆ)RR(ˆˆ)RR(ASR 43210 βββββ +++−+−−=
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Appendix A reports a comprehensive set of firm- and industry-level covariates, following the 
widely used models of financial analyst metrics (Jegadeesh et al., 2004) and firm financial value 
in finance and accounting (Lui, Markov, and Tamayo, 2007). This allows us to calibrate the extent 
to which CSP contributes new information in explaining analyst recommendations and firm value. 
Analyses and Results 
Because the dataset is cross-sectional and time-series in nature, empirical analyses should 
accommodate several features. First, we need to control for observable and unobservable 
heterogeneity. Regarding observable heterogeneity in results, we have included many (firm-, 
analyst-, and industry-level) covariates to rule out multi-level alternative explanations of the 
modeling results. To accommodate firm-specific unobservable heterogeneity, we adopt the 
changes-in-changes model and test the impact of changes in CSP on changes in analyst 
recommendations and firm financial value. Also, to account for the biases of endogeneity, 
heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation in cross-sectional and time-series data, we employ the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) for estimations. Endogeneity may exist in that firms with 
more favorable analyst recommendations and higher value can afford more CSP investments. To 
account for endogeneity, we use instrumental variables with the lagged business segment at t-2 
and lagged industry CSP at time period t-2. To test the validity of these instruments, we 
conducted the Hansen (1982) test. GMM also employs the White heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation robust covariance matrix :  
(3)        ,  , 
where ε = the vector of the White residuals, k = the kernel, q = the bandwidth, and Zt = a k x p 
matrix in GMM (see Hamilton, 1994: 409-22). 
To rule out reverse causality from analyst recommendations to CSP, we conducted the 
Granger causality test (Granger, 1969) and confirmed the direction of influence from CSP to 
HACΦˆ
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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analyst recommendations (FGranger test = 28.089 with KLD and 25.623 with ESG, both p < 0.01), 
rather than the reverse direction (p > 0.10).2  
Testing mediation requires a system of equations. Specifically, we follow the commonly 
recommended approach (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Shaver 2005: 338). The following regression 
equations are utilized, where CSP = the independent variable of changes in CSP, Recom = the 
mediator variable of analyst stock recommendations, Perf  = the final dependent variable of firm 
future return (at time t+1; see Dhaliwal et al., 2011: 66). 
   (4)       ΔPerf  = β10 + β11ΔCSP + ΔControls + ε1. 
This equation gauges the effects of CSP on firm stock performance.  
   (5)     ΔRecom = β20 + β21ΔCSP + ΔControls + ε2. 
Equation (5) assesses the effect of CSP on the mediator of analyst recommendations.  
   (6)     ΔPerf = β30 + β31ΔCSP +  β32ΔRecom + ΔControls + ε3. 
Following Shaver (2005: 338), we estimated this system of equations 5-6 with the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS). Specifically, according to Shaver (2005), if the errors terms (ε2 and ε3) in 
equations 5 and 6 are correlated, the traditional approach with Baron and Kenny (1986) would 
lead to wrong conclusions. Thus, 2SLS is recommended to correct the possible bias due to the 
correlated error terms. That is, the predicted value of analyst recommendations in equation 5 is 
treated as an endogeneous variable and entered in equation 6. In this way, the predicted value of 
analyst recommendations (the instrument variable) will not correlate with ε3 even if ε2 and ε3 are 
correlated (Shaver, 2005: 338). The 2SLS results are reported in Table 2.  
 
                                                            
2  Furthermore, we tested various model assumptions with the RESET test, the Durbin-Watson and White’s test, the 
Jarque-Bera test, the Davidson-MacKinnon test of endogeneity, and the Breusch-Pagan test. None of the 
assumptions are violated in the results. Finally, the multicollinearity problem is not a serious threat to our results 
because all variance inflation factor results are less than five and the condition indices are less than ten. 
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As reported in Table 2, firm CSP is positively associated with analyst recommendations. 
CSP information by both KLD and ESG is indeed positively related to analyst recommendations 
(both p < 0.01). In order to establish mediation from CSPÆ recommendationsÆfirm return chain, 
CSP must affect recommendations, and recommendations must affect firm return. Table 2 results 
indicate that, for both the KLD and ESG datasets, CSP affects recommendations (p < 0.01). 
Entering the mediator of recommendations reduces the strength of the effects of CSP on firm 
stock returns (from p < 0.05 to p < 0.10), thus supporting the partial mediation role of analyst 
recommendations in the effects of CSP on firm stock returns.  
In order to gauge whether the indirect mediation effects are statistically significant (Sobel, 
1982), we also conducted the extended Sobel test with the bootstrapping meditation approach 
(Zhao, Lynch and Chen, 2010). The extended Sobel test model is: 222222/ baabvalue sssbsaabz ++= , 
where a and sa are coefficients and standard errors (from the bootstrapping) for the impact of 
independent variables on mediators, while b and sb are coefficients and standard errors for the 
impact of mediators on the dependent variable. We find that the Sobel test results are significant 
(zvalue = 4.307 with KLD and 4.678 with ESG, p < 0.01), thus supporting the indirect mediation 
role of analyst recommendations in the effects of CSP on firm stock returns. 
To test the robustness of our mediational results, we not only used the strength and 
weakness of firm CSP (Waldman et al., 2006), but also employed the primary and secondary 
types of CSP (Godfrey et al., 2009; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Mattingly and Berman, 2006; Yoon 
et al., 2006). The results (not reported but available upon request) consistently support the 
mediational role of analyst recommendations across the strength, weakness, primary, and 
secondary types of CSP, although this mediation role is more salient in the case of the weakness 
and primary types of CSP.  
DISCUSSION 
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With both qualitative and quantitative evidences, this study confirms that analysts act as 
mediators in the CSP-CFP link. As industry experts and the ‘information bridge,’ analysts reduce 
the information asymmetry associated with CSP, by incorporating firm CSP information into their 
recommendations for general investors.  
Furthermore, we extend the literature on the role of analysts by revealing CSP as another 
critical intangible asset, to which analysts pay increasing attention. Given the growing importance 
of social investing and fund managers’ quest for ‘investment with a conscience,’ more frequently 
firm CSP is addressed as an intangible and promising asset by analysts. While previous studies 
have examined the role of analysts in reducing information asymmetry associated with other firm 
intangibles such as research-and-development and customer satisfaction (e.g., Kimbrough, 2007; 
Luo, Homburg, and Wieseke, 2010), few empirical analyses link firm CSP to security analysts 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011, 2012; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). Our work thus examines the under-
researched issue of the relevance of firm CSP for stock analysts.  
In practice, analysts may respond to firm CSP and adapt their buy-and-sell 
recommendations accordingly, while investors rely heavily on analyst recommendations (e.g., 
Barber et al., 2001; Womack, 1996). Thus, firm managers should be cognizant of such analyst-
based mechanisms which may account for the ultimate financial returns to CSP. In this sense, 
analysts can be considered a strategically important component of firms’ multi-stakeholder 
management. By taking into account the effect of CSP on analysts, managers can acquire a more 
complete picture of the eventual financial impact of their investment in firm CSP.  
In conclusion, our study hopefully helps researchers and practitioners understand the 
analyst-based mechanism underlying the impact of firm CSP on shareholder wealth. We 
encourage further research to uncover more insights into this important area. 
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Appendix A: Data for Covariates  
We have a comprehensive set of firm- and industry-level covariates, closely following the widely used 
models of financial analyst metrics (Jegadeesh et al., 2004) and firm financial value in finance and 
accounting (Lui et al., 2007). This allows us to calibrate the extent to which CSP contributes new 
information in explaining analyst recommendations and firm value. Firm profitability (ROA) is measured as 
the ratio of a firm’s operating income (from COMPUSTAT) to its book value of total assets. ROA 
variability is measured as the standard deviation of the reported prior five years of ROA. R&D intensity is 
measured as research and development expenses divided by sales. Firm financial leverage is the ratio of 
long-term book debt to total assets (Thomas, 2002). Firm dividend is the ratio of cash dividends to firm 
market capitalization. Firm liquidity is the current ratio of a firm. Analysts’ earnings forecast errors are 
gauged as the differences (in absolute values) between the latest analysts’ median consensus forecasts 
(MEDEST) before the earnings announcements and the firms’ actual earnings per share scaled by stock 
prices (Barth et al., 2001). We assess the public disclosure of firm social activities with two measures: self-
disclosure and other-disclosure. Directly following Tetlock (2007) and Dhaliwal et al. (2011), we collect 
information on public disclosure from several sources: (1) corporate social responsibility newswire, (2) 
Corporateregister.com, (3) Internet searches, (4) company websites, and (5) media Lexis/Nexis database. If 
the disclosure is conducted by the firm itself, we classified it as self-disclosure (self); otherwise, we 
classified the disclosure as other-disclosure (media) of firm CSP information. Results also confirmed that 
favorable public disclosure leads to positive returns, and unfavorable disclosure leads to negative returns 
(all p < 0.01). We also tested the hypotheses with total information disclosure (= self + media), and the 
results were consistently supportive of our conclusion on the mediational role of analyst recommendations 
and the moderating role of information disclosure as hypothesized. Analyst coverage is measured as the 
number (in natural log) of financial analysts following or covering the stock of the firm (Barron, Byard, 
and Kim, 2002). Following prior accounting studies (Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder, 2007: 583), we measure 
analyst expertise as the firm-specific experience of the financial analysts working at the brokerage firm 
(Chen and Matsumoto, 2006).3 The data for institutional ownership are obtained from the Thompson 
Financial CDA/Spectrum database of SEC 13F filings. This variable assesses how many percentages of the 
firm’s shares are owned by institutions relative to the total shares outstanding of the firm (Yan and Zhang, 
2009). Industry competition is measured as the Herfindahl concentration index, which is the sum of 
squared market shares of the firms in the industry derived from the sales revenue (from COMPUSTAT), 
on the basis of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (Hou and Robinson, 2006: 1933). 
Environmental volatility is the degree of uncertainty of the broad stock market returns 
(AMEX/NYSE/NASDAQ indexes). We measure it with the conditional volatility in the Fama-French-
Carhart model at the market level as follows:  
 (A1)      
ωt+1  = α0 + α1  + γ1 ωt,        Φt+1 | (Φt, Φt-1, …) ~ N(0, ωt+1),      
where ωt+1 = the latent conditional variance of residual terms, or the measure of financial market volatility. 
We obtain the daily stock market return from CRSP and French’s website.  
  
                                                            
3  Per one anonymous reviewer, we conducted additional analyses by aggregating the firm-specific analyst experience 
to industry-specific analyst experience, and the results are qualitatively the same. 
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Table 1: Anecdotic evidence on financial analysts’ attention to firm CSP information  
Analyst 
Report  
Year Covered 
Firm  
CSP category  
(covered by KLD) 
Cites from analyst report Source 
Goldman 
Sachs 
2011 Yum! Product 
Marketing/Contracting Concern 
The company has recently been involved in 
major marketing or contracting 
controversies, or has paid substantial fines or 
civil penalties relating to advertising 
practices, consumer fraud, or government 
contracting. 
‘Taco Bell SSS has been very disappointing in 2011 at 0% in 1Q and -5% in 
2Q. These results have been attributed to a highly publicized lawsuit filed 
mid-1Q that made accusations about the quality of Taco Bell’s beef.’ (p. 10) 
 
Background:  
Lawsuit against Yum! brand Taco Bell because of using a meat mixture that 
contains binders and extenders, and does not meet the minimum 
requirements set by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The suit was filed to 
order Taco Bell to be honest in its advertising.  
http://www.bluema
umau.org/files/YU
M%20US%20deep
%20dive%208.1.11
.pdf  
Thomas 
Weisel 
Partners 
2003 Cerner Product 
Other Strength  
The company's products have notable social 
benefits that are highly unusual or unique for 
its industry. 
‘Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) allows a physician to enter 
prescription orders into a computer to check potential drug interactions and 
allergies against an electronic medical record. While hospitals are concerned 
with cost containment and efficiency, patient safety appears to be the top 
driver for implementing a CPOE system. Various studies have proven that 
CPOE systems overall reduce adverse drug events by 86%. The Mayo Clinic 
also noted that CPOE systems can help avoid expensive malpractice 
lawsuits.’ (p. 1) 
http://analystreports
.som.yale.edu/inter
nal/Professional%2
0Reports/stevenhal
per/Heal062703-
081844.pdf  
Investology 2004 Premcor Employee Relations 
Health and Safety Strength 
The company has strong health and safety 
programs. 
‘At the same time, we think that there may be one potential concern that is 
related to operations…from investors’ perspective, it is important to 
recognize that growth entails risks and one of them is potential lack of focus 
on operational aspects that could lead to unexpected financial costs. This 
may not be a significant factor but one might conclude that PCO’s safety 
program, for whatever reason, is less visible than of the industry leaders.’ (p. 
12) 
http://analystreports
.som.yale.edu/inter
nal/Professional%2
0Reports/Premcor.
pdf  
Barclays 
Capital 
2011 HCL 
Technologies 
Employee Relations 
(general) 
‘…The business continues to turn around, with losses for the quarter reduced 
by US$0.6mn. Hiring in the IT Services segment (a 6% q/q increase in 
manpower) indicates good business visibility. Attrition rates declined by 
0.6%, implying better employee satisfaction.’ (p. 3)  
http://pg.jrj.com.cn/
acc/Res%5CCN_R
ES%5CINVEST%5
C2011%5C10%5C1
9%5C4f26c1de-
abb4-47a1-9588-
e98f9d2c9852.pdf  
Firstcall  2012 Kansai 
Nerolac Paints 
Employee Relations 
Health and Safety Strength 
The company has received OHSAS-18001 
accreditation–a British Standard for 
occupational health and safety management. 
‘Company’s manufacturing units have received ISO 9001-2000, ISO-14001 
and OHSAS-18001 for its quality management…We recommend ‘BUY’ in 
this particular scrip with a target price of Rs.994.00 for Medium to Long 
term investment.’ (p. 1, 9) 
http://breport.myiris
.com/firstcall/GOO
NERPA_20120203.
pdf  
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Morningstar 2009 Hewlett-
Packard 
Corporate Governance 
Limited Compensation 
The company has recently awarded notably 
low levels of compensation to its top 
management or its board members. The limit 
for a rating is total compensation of less than 
$500,000 per year for a CEO or $30,000 per 
year for outside directors. 
‘…bonus compensation strikes us as rich, despite the company's recent 
financial results.’ (p. 7) 
http://analystreports.
som.yale.edu/intern
al/F2010/profcomp/
HP.pdf  
Edelweiss 2012 Jain Irrigation 
Systems  
Community 
Financial Support and Technology Service 
The company launches a non-banking 
finance company focusing on financing 
farmers for MIS, agriculture projects, small 
businesses, setting up solar pumps and other 
appliances. 
‘Jain Irrigation (JISL) has finally received RBI’s approval to launch its 
NBFC. This, we believe, will help the company ease its stretched working 
capital cycle (steep gross receivable days of MIS at 340 days at FY12 end). 
JISL plans to expand this NBFC into a pan-India player over the next 3-4 
years. Maintain ‘BUY.’ (p. 1) 
http://breport.myiris
.com/EDELWEISS/
JAIIRRSY_201207
06.pdf  
Sal. 
Oppenheim 
2007 Petrotec Environment 
Beneficial Products and Services 
The company derives substantial revenues 
from innovative remediation products, 
environmental services. 
‘We see the market for biofuel offering strong growth opportunities resulting 
from numerous initiatives in the EU, as well as the US. Based on its strong 
technical know how, Petrotec has positioned itself in an attractive niche of 
this market, i.e. the collection and conversion of difficult-to-process low-cost 
feedstock into biodiesel. This gives the company a grip on sourcing, as well 
as a sizable cost advantage….We thus initiate coverage of Petrotec with a 
buy rating…[because] a rising environmental awareness is one of the initial 
drivers for renewable energies.’ (p. 1, 15) 
www.equitystory.co
m/Download/Comp
anies/petrotec/Ratin
gAnalysen/SalOpp_
Initial_230107.pdf  
Morgan 
Stanley 
2010 Dow Chemical Environment 
Beneficial Products and Services 
The company has developed innovative 
products with environmental benefits. 
‘Market underestimates innovations in Dow Agrosciences (the launch of 
SmartStax will have a material effect on Dow) and Advanced Materials 
(solar shingles and diesel particulate filters represent potentially disruptive 
technologies and large opportunities).’ (p. 63) 
http://www.morgans
tanley.com/views/pe
rspectives/preparing
for_supercycle.pdf  
KRChoksey  2011 Praj Industries Environment 
Beneficial Products and Projects 
The company develops solutions for bio-
ethanol, biodiesel, waste water treatment, 
customized engineering and bio-
consumables. 
‘Better days are coming ahead, BUY…US Government’s shift towards 
cleaner fuels will present a business opportunity of USD 7-8 bn for PIL and 
the company has started receiving enquiries for the same…New Businesses 
to start making meaningful contribution from FY12: To diversify business 
risk, Praj has crafted plans to enter into water & waste water treatment, 
customized engineering and bio-consumables.’ (p. 1) 
http://www.valuenot
es.com/uploads/artic
le_pdf/A100591300
850008.pdf  
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               Table 2: Results for CSP, Analyst Recommendations, and Firm Future Returns from 2SLS Estimation 
   
M1 (KLD) 
Analyst  
Recom 
M2 (KLD) 
Firm  
Return 
M3 (KLD) 
Firm  
Return
M4 (ESG) 
Analyst  
Recom 
M5 (ESG) 
Firm  
Return 
M6 (ESG) 
Firm  
Return
ΔCSP 1.273*** 1.322** 0.815* 1.292*** 1.639** 0.836* 
Mediation Effects       
ΔAnalyst Recommendations (Recom)   0.239***   0.242*** 
Controls       
ΔSelf-Disclosure 2.608** 1.521** 1.145* 2.361** 0.816 0.782 
ΔOther-Disclosure 2.339** 0.705 0.675 2.229** 0.722 0.681 
ΔROA 2.107*** 2.697** 2.752** 2.193*** 2.695** 2.763** 
ΔROA Variability -0.128 -1.331* -1.411* -0.118 -1.328* -1.406* 
ΔFirm Size 0.178** 0.479** 0.487** 0.176** 0.481** 0.432** 
ΔR&D Intensity 1.297* 0.151* 0.161* 1.291* 0.156* 0.161* 
ΔFinancial Leverage -0.049 0.030 0.038 -0.045 0.041 0.046 
ΔDividend 1.312* 0.044 0.055 1.317* 0.055 0.059 
ΔLiquidity 0.008 0.125 0.128 0.009 0.129 0.118 
ΔAnalyst Coverage 1.772** 0.321** 0.332** 1.774** 0.321** 0.331** 
ΔAnalyst Forecast Errors 0.880* -0.071 -0.079 0.881* -0.072 -0.078 
ΔAnalyst Expertise 0.635* 0.138* 0.146** 0.638* 0.138* 0.141** 
ΔInstitutional Ownership 3.128** 0.071 0.076 3.123** 0.071 0.062 
ΔEnvironmental Volatility -0.669** -0.439** -0.519** -0.654** -0.438** -0.506** 
ΔIndustry Competition -0.025 -0.041 -0.042 -0.029 -0.051 -0.047 
R-squared 0.31 0.21 0.34 0.33 0.22 0.36 
F-statistic 16.818 8.625 13.539 17.085 8.872 15.017 
N 3,490 3,490 3,490 6,856 6,856 6,856 
     Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.   
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
